What AWS Outages Teach SAP Integration Suite Teams About Regional Failover

Cloud outages rarely unfold as neatly as disaster recovery plans assume. An individual service fails, its dependencies begin to struggle, monitoring becomes unreliable, and recovery takes longer than expected. By the time the original problem is resolved, other systems may still be processing accumulated work or attempting to restore connectivity.
For enterprises running business-critical integrations, these cascading effects can be more disruptive than the initial infrastructure failure.
SAP Integration Suite regional failover is not simply about maintaining a secondary tenant. It is about ensuring that integrations can continue, recover or resume safely when the primary region and its supporting services become unavailable.
Three major AWS us-east-1 incidents, in November 2020, December 2021 and October 2025, illustrate why this distinction matters.
Their publicly documented incident histories reveal three recurring patterns: shared dependencies can spread failures across otherwise healthy services, control-plane disruptions can complicate recovery, and the effects of an outage can continue long after its root cause has been addressed.
Although these events do not establish that SAP Integration Suite tenants were directly affected, their failure mechanisms provide valuable lessons for enterprise integration architecture.
Understanding those mechanisms helps teams design recovery strategies that protect not only infrastructure availability, but also message integrity, transaction continuity and business operations.
Understanding regional resilience in SAP Integration Suite
Before examining the incidents, it is important to distinguish high availability from disaster recovery.
High availability is designed to maintain service operation when individual infrastructure components fail. Cloud services commonly achieve this through redundant infrastructure distributed across availability zones within a region.
Regional disaster recovery addresses a broader failure scenario: the loss or prolonged impairment of an entire region, or of a dependency shared by multiple availability zones.
A service can therefore be highly available within a region without having an independently recoverable deployment in another region.
SAP Integration Suite operates within the availability and resilience architecture of SAP Business Technology Platform. However, the availability of built-in cross-region disaster recovery varies by service and deployment configuration.
For Cloud Integration landscapes requiring a separately managed recovery environment, organizations may need a secondary tenant in another supported region, synchronized integration artifacts, independent connectivity and an operational mechanism for activating workloads.
An important distinction follows.
A secondary tenant provides deployment redundancy. It does not automatically provide end-to-end business continuity.
An integration may depend on an external identity service, a database, a message broker, a routing platform or an on-premise application. If those dependencies remain unavailable, moving the integration flow to another region may not restore the business process.
For a more detailed architectural comparison, see Tarento's guide to SAP Integration Suite high availability versus disaster recovery.
Availability, recovery and continuity are different objectives
Enterprise resilience planning often uses three related measures.
| Measure | What it means | Practical integration example |
|---|---|---|
| Recovery Time Objective (RTO) | The maximum targeted time to restore an affected service or process | Critical order integrations must resume within an agreed recovery window |
| Recovery Point Objective (RPO) | The maximum acceptable loss of recoverable data or processing state, expressed in time | The business defines how much message history or transaction state may be lost |
| Business continuity | The ability to sustain or safely resume essential business operations | Orders continue through a secondary integration path, or are recovered without loss or unacceptable duplication |
RTO and RPO are business requirements, not guarantees delivered by the existence of a standby tenant.
Their achievable values depend on the complete architecture, including persistent message storage, replication behavior, downstream availability and recovery procedures.
This becomes particularly important when an outage affects multiple interdependent services.
November 2020: How one service failure affected multiple dependencies
On November 25, 2020, AWS experienced a major disruption involving Amazon Kinesis Data Streams in its Northern Virginia region, us-east-1.
The incident began during a capacity expansion of the Kinesis front-end infrastructure. As servers established additional communication threads, the system encountered an operating-system thread limit that prevented the fleet from functioning normally.
What appeared to be a localized streaming-service problem had consequences beyond Kinesis itself.
Several AWS services used Kinesis as an internal dependency. As the disruption continued, services associated with authentication, monitoring and infrastructure operations experienced their own failures or degraded behavior.
Amazon Cognito experienced authentication-related disruptions. CloudWatch metrics and monitoring capabilities were also affected, limiting visibility into applications during the incident. The recovery required more than correcting a single configuration. Restoring the affected fleet and allowing dependent services to recover extended the disruption through much of the day.
Why the failure spread
Cloud platforms consist of many services that depend on other services. An application might not use a particular infrastructure component directly, yet depend on an authentication or monitoring system that uses it internally.
This creates a dependency chain:
Business application → Integration service → Supporting cloud capability → Shared infrastructure dependency If the shared dependency fails, multiple services can experience problems simultaneously. Redundancy in one layer cannot compensate for a dependency that remains a single point of failure elsewhere.
What this teaches SAP Integration Suite teams
Consider an enterprise order-processing landscape. SAP Integration Suite receives orders through an API, transforms them and forwards them to an ERP system. The integration runtime is monitored through a centralized observability platform, while incident notifications are sent through a separate alerting service.
Now imagine that the integration runtime remains accessible, but its supporting authentication, monitoring or downstream connectivity becomes unavailable. The service may appear operational from an infrastructure perspective while business transactions fail. If monitoring depends on the same impaired infrastructure, the operations team may not immediately recognize the problem. This illustrates the importance of distinguishing technical availability from functional availability.
A health check that confirms an endpoint responds is useful, but it may not establish that the integration can complete its intended transaction.
Design implication: Monitor business outcomes, not only service availability
A stronger monitoring strategy combines multiple signals:
- Endpoint health: Is the integration endpoint reachable?
- Processing health: Are messages being processed successfully?
- Dependency health: Can the integration reach required applications and services?
- Backlog health: Are pending messages accumulating unusually?
- Business health: Are important transactions completing within acceptable time limits?
For example, a synthetic transaction could periodically submit a non-production test order through a controlled integration path and verify the expected acknowledgment. Such a test provides more meaningful evidence of end-to-end availability than a basic HTTP response. However, synthetic transactions must be designed carefully to avoid changing production business data.
The lesson: A resilient integration architecture needs independent monitoring capable of detecting when a technically available system is no longer delivering its intended business function.
December 2021: When the infrastructure kept running but management became difficult
On December 7, 2021, another disruption affected AWS us-east-1. An automated scaling activity generated unexpected connection behavior between AWS's internal service network and its primary network. The resulting congestion affected network devices responsible for communication between these environments.
Several AWS services experienced errors or delays. Monitoring and management capabilities were among those affected. Importantly, the disruption did not mean every running application in the region stopped operating.
Existing workloads could continue running while operations involving infrastructure management APIs became difficult or temporarily unavailable. This exposed a fundamental distinction in cloud architecture.
Understanding the control plane and data plane
Cloud systems generally separate operational responsibilities into two categories.
The data plane performs the actual work of the service. It processes requests, transfers data or serves application traffic.
The control plane manages how that work is configured and operated. It handles activities such as resource provisioning, configuration changes and administrative operations.
Consider a simple example. A cloud-hosted API may continue processing requests through an existing load balancer. But administrators may be unable to update its configuration if the relevant management service is impaired.
The application is still running, but the organization has temporarily lost some ability to change how it runs. This becomes especially important during disaster recovery.
The hidden risk in a manual failover procedure
Imagine an enterprise with SAP Integration Suite tenants in two regions. The recovery procedure requires an administrator to sign in to a console, update integration configurations, activate secondary workloads and modify DNS routing. Each step depends on management capabilities.
If those capabilities are impaired during a regional outage, the secondary tenant may be available but difficult to activate or direct traffic toward. The problem is not necessarily the absence of recovery infrastructure. It is the dependence of the recovery procedure on services that may themselves be affected.
Design implication: Reduce control-plane dependencies during recovery
Cloud resilience practices generally favor preconfigured recovery mechanisms over last-minute infrastructure changes. For example, a traffic management system can be configured in advance with health checks and routing policies that direct traffic toward a healthy destination. This can reduce the need for manual DNS configuration changes during an incident.
For SAP Integration Suite, the same principle applies to recovery design. The secondary tenant, essential credentials, integration artifacts, connectivity and routing configuration should be prepared before they are needed. The failover procedure should also distinguish between actions that are already configured and actions that still depend on live management APIs.
| Recovery activity | Potential dependency | Design consideration |
|---|---|---|
| Detect primary failure | Monitoring and alerting services | Use independently available health signals |
| Activate secondary flows | Tenant management APIs | Validate availability and alternative operating procedures |
| Redirect inbound traffic | DNS or traffic management | Preconfigure routing wherever appropriate |
| Authenticate to the secondary environment | Identity services and certificates | Prepare and test secondary-region access |
| Verify restored processing | Application and integration monitoring | Confirm actual business transactions |
| Return to the primary region | Management, routing and reconciliation | Plan failback separately from initial failover |
Hosting a recovery management portal in another region can reduce regional concentration risk. It does not automatically eliminate all dependencies on SAP APIs, identity providers, routing systems or other administrative services. These dependencies must be explicitly identified and tested.
The lesson: Disaster recovery should be designed around the capabilities likely to remain available during an incident, not the assumption that every administrative operation will continue to work.
October 2025: Why fixing the root cause did not immediately restore the region
The October 19–20, 2025 AWS us-east-1 incident provides another important lesson about recovery behavior. The initial disruption involved DNS resolution for Amazon DynamoDB.
A race condition within automated DNS management caused the regional DynamoDB endpoint to lose its expected address records. Applications and internal services attempting to establish connections to DynamoDB began experiencing errors. AWS identified the underlying DNS problem and restored the missing information during the early hours of October 20. The primary DynamoDB API disruption lasted approximately three hours.
However, the broader regional incident continued for approximately fourteen and a half hours.
Why recovery took longer
The original failure affected services that depended on DynamoDB for internal state management. Some systems accumulated unfinished work or repeatedly retried failed operations.
When DynamoDB became available again, those systems still needed to recover their internal state and process accumulated requests.
EC2 instance-launch capabilities experienced extended problems. Network Load Balancer connection errors also appeared during the broader recovery period.
The incident demonstrated that restoring a shared dependency does not immediately restore every system that relied on it.
Recovery may proceed in stages:
- The underlying service failure is corrected.
- Connections and dependent services begin recovering.
- Backlogged work and retries are processed.
- Distributed state becomes consistent again.
- Applications resume normal business operations.
These stages can take different amounts of time.
What this means for enterprise integrations
An enterprise integration landscape may exhibit similar recovery patterns when its dependencies become unavailable. Consider an integration flow that receives customer orders and writes them to a database. During a database outage, the integration may retry failed writes or retain messages for later processing, depending on its configuration and persistence mechanisms.
After the database becomes available, previously failed operations may need to be retried.
But several questions remain:
- Were all failed messages stored durably?
- Did any request succeed before the client timed out?
- Could retrying a request create a duplicate transaction?
- Are messages processed in the order required by the business?
- Can the downstream system handle the accumulated workload?
These questions determine whether restored connectivity results in a correct business outcome.
The problem of ambiguous transaction outcomes
One of the most difficult integration failure scenarios occurs when a request times out after the receiving application has already committed the transaction. The sending system may assume the request failed and retry it.
Without appropriate duplicate protection, the downstream application could process the same business transaction twice. An order integration, for example, might submit an order successfully but fail to receive the acknowledgment. A retry could create a duplicate order unless the receiving system recognizes the repeated business transaction.
This is why retries and idempotency are closely connected.
Designing idempotent recovery
An idempotent operation can be repeated without producing unintended additional business effects. Common techniques include stable transaction identifiers, duplicate detection, unique business keys and downstream APIs designed to recognize repeated requests.
For SAP Integration Suite, the appropriate mechanism depends on the connected systems and transaction requirements.
A retry policy alone does not guarantee exactly-once business processing. Even when a messaging infrastructure offers delivery guarantees, the receiving application must still handle ambiguous outcomes and repeated requests correctly.
Messages in flight require separate attention
Cross-region failover introduces another challenge. Messages stored in a primary tenant's local queues or data stores are not automatically transferred to a secondary tenant merely because both environments contain the same integration flows.
A secondary tenant may be ready to process new traffic while earlier messages remain in the primary environment. Depending on the architecture, recovery may require a durable external messaging layer, controlled replay or reconciliation after the primary environment returns.
These mechanisms should be designed before a disruption.
The lesson: Recovery must be measured by the restoration of correct business transactions, not simply by a service becoming reachable again.
What the three outages reveal about regional resilience
Although the events had different causes, their architectural implications share a common pattern.
| Incident | Primary failure mechanism | Broader lesson | SAP Integration Suite design implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| November 2020 | Shared service dependency failure | Supporting services can fail together | Independent monitoring and dependency-aware health checks |
| December 2021 | Internal networking and control-plane impairment | Running workloads and management capabilities can fail differently | Preconfigured recovery paths with fewer control-plane dependencies |
| October 2025 | DNS failure followed by cascading recovery delays | Dependent systems can remain impaired after the root cause is resolved | Message durability, idempotency, backlog recovery and business-level validation |
The most important conclusion is that regional resilience depends on the entire path needed to complete a business transaction.
A second integration runtime is only one component of that path.
Four principles for designing SAP Integration Suite regional failover
The incident patterns can be translated into four practical architecture principles.
1. Identify the complete failure domain
A failure domain is the collection of components that may become unavailable because of a shared dependency or event. Availability zones and regions are important boundaries, but they are not the only ones.
An SAP Integration Suite landscape can also depend on shared identity services, databases, network connections, traffic management, on-premise infrastructure and external APIs.
A dependency map should answer three questions:
- Which services are required to execute each critical integration?
- Which services share infrastructure or regional dependencies?
- Which dependencies remain necessary after traffic moves to the secondary tenant?
This helps distinguish genuine redundancy from duplicated components that still depend on the same underlying service.
2. Define failover decisions using business impact
Failover should not depend solely on whether a cloud provider has acknowledged an incident. The decision should consider affected business processes, elapsed time, recovery targets and readiness of the secondary environment.
For example, a critical payment integration may justify a different recovery response from a non-urgent reporting interface. However, immediately switching regions is not always the safest option.
A premature failover can introduce duplicate processing, incomplete transactions or inconsistent downstream state. The decision framework should therefore consider both the cost of waiting and the risks of switching.
3. Design message continuity separately from workload continuity
Workload continuity means that an integration runtime is available to process requests. Message continuity means that transactions are not unintentionally lost, duplicated or left permanently unprocessed during the transition.
The two are related but distinct. A properly provisioned secondary tenant may process new messages successfully while the primary environment still contains messages that require recovery. Organizations should define how those outstanding transactions will be recovered and reconciled.
4. Treat failover and failback as separate operations
Moving workloads to a secondary region and returning them to the primary region are not identical procedures. Failback may require additional reconciliation, configuration updates, state recovery and traffic coordination.
A system should not automatically return to the primary region simply because the original outage appears resolved. The primary environment must be verified as ready, and the organization must understand what changed while the secondary region was active. This reduces the risk of restoring an inconsistent environment.
A practical SAP Integration Suite failover sequence
A well-designed recovery procedure can be understood as a series of operational stages.
Stage 1: Detect and classify the failure
Independent health checks identify degraded service. Operations teams determine whether the problem affects the integration runtime, an external dependency or a broader regional capability.
The objective is to avoid unnecessary failover when the secondary environment would encounter the same problem.
Stage 2: Verify recovery readiness
Confirm that the secondary tenant and required dependencies are accessible. Review integration artifact versions, credentials, routing configuration and critical connectivity. Determine whether the environment can support the business workload before activation.
Stage 3: Establish a controlled processing boundary
Where possible, prevent new processing from starting on the primary side before activating equivalent single-active workloads in the secondary region. This is especially important for polling, scheduled integrations and other flows that may produce duplicate business effects when both tenants operate simultaneously.
If the primary environment is unreachable, the recovery procedure must account for the inability to confirm its processing state.
Stage 4: Activate the recovery environment
Start the required integration workloads in the appropriate order. Apply the configured traffic-switching mechanism.
Validate connectivity to external applications and required infrastructure. The sequence should reflect business dependencies rather than simply activating every integration simultaneously.
Stage 5: Validate business processing
Confirm that representative transactions are completing through the secondary environment. Review errors, queues, acknowledgments and downstream records.
A successful health check is useful, but completed business transactions provide stronger evidence of recovery.
Stage 6: Reconcile outstanding work
Identify transactions that may have been interrupted during the incident. Determine whether they succeeded, failed or remain uncertain.
Recover or replay messages only after evaluating duplicate-processing risks and downstream state.
Stage 7: Prepare a controlled failback
When the primary environment has recovered, synchronize necessary changes and verify its readiness. Plan the return of traffic and single-active workloads carefully. Retain recovery logs and reconciliation evidence for post-incident review. This sequence is illustrative. The exact procedure must be adapted to the architecture, supported SAP APIs, connected applications and business requirements of each landscape.
SAP Integration Suite regional failover readiness checklist
A secondary tenant should be considered operationally ready only when the organization has sufficient evidence that recovery can be performed safely.
| Readiness area | Validation question | Evidence to collect |
|---|---|---|
| Regional deployment | Is the secondary environment provisioned and accessible? | Tenant availability and connectivity checks |
| Artifact synchronization | Are essential integration artifacts and configurations aligned? | Version and configuration comparisons |
| Identity and security | Are credentials, certificates and authentication dependencies valid? | Successful controlled authentication tests |
| Independent monitoring | Can critical failures be detected outside the primary failure domain? | Monitoring and alert delivery tests |
| Traffic routing | Can inbound traffic reach the secondary tenant through the intended recovery mechanism? | Routing switch test results |
| Single-active processing | Can scheduled and polling integrations avoid simultaneous execution? | Activation and deactivation test results |
| Message continuity | Can interrupted or retained messages be identified and recovered? | Queue and transaction reconciliation results |
| Business validation | Do representative transactions complete successfully after failover? | End-to-end test records |
| Recovery time | Does the measured recovery meet the agreed RTO? | Timed recovery exercise |
| Recovery point | Does the recoverable state meet the agreed RPO? | State and message-loss assessment |
| Failback | Can processing safely return to the primary tenant? | Verified failback and reconciliation results |
These checks should be performed regularly and after material changes to the integration landscape. Readiness is not a permanent property. It changes when new integrations are deployed, credentials rotate, dependencies change or infrastructure configurations drift.
How to measure the effectiveness of a disaster recovery exercise
A disaster recovery rehearsal is useful only when it produces measurable evidence. Rather than recording that the exercise was successful because the secondary tenant started, organizations should evaluate the complete recovery process.
Recovery time
Measure the interval between the agreed incident trigger and the point at which the critical business process is functioning through the recovery environment. This provides a meaningful measure of actual recovery performance against the RTO.
Recovery point
Determine how much transaction state or message history would be lost under the tested failure scenario. This must be evaluated against the agreed RPO. For asynchronous replication or independently persisted messages, recovery-point behavior may differ across integrations.
Transaction correctness
Validate that transactions were not unintentionally duplicated, omitted or processed out of order where ordering is required. A useful recovery test should include some transactions whose outcomes become uncertain during the simulated failure.
Operational dependencies
Record which steps required manual intervention and which relied on services that could become unavailable during a regional incident. This identifies opportunities to improve automation, preconfiguration and recovery independence.
Failback integrity
Confirm that workloads can return to the primary environment without introducing new inconsistencies. The exercise should demonstrate that recovery is controlled in both directions. Taken together, these measurements provide a more meaningful picture of resilience than a simple availability percentage.
Where automated failover management fits into the architecture
Many SAP Integration Suite disaster recovery challenges are operational rather than purely infrastructural. An organization may already have a secondary tenant, but maintaining configuration consistency and executing the recovery procedure can require significant coordination. Integration packages change, credentials expire, certificates rotate and runtime dependencies evolve. If these changes are not reflected in the secondary environment, the recovery architecture can gradually become less reliable.
Automated resilience management can help by improving visibility into configuration drift, reducing repetitive synchronization activities and providing a more controlled approach to recovery operations.
However, automation does not eliminate the need for sound architecture.
A recovery management system still depends on accessible APIs, valid authentication, properly configured routing and the availability of external business systems. Its effectiveness should therefore be evaluated as part of the complete recovery process.
How OneFailover supports SAP Integration Suite resilience
OneFailover is Tarento's resilience management application for SAP Integration Suite. It is designed to help organizations manage a secondary integration environment and improve the operational readiness of cross-region recovery configurations.
The solution's published architecture includes tenant synchronization, Git-based artifact versioning and backup, centralized administration and integration with enterprise traffic-routing mechanisms.
An administration environment separate from the primary and secondary regions can reduce concentration of operational dependencies. The solution also provides readiness visibility intended to help teams identify configuration differences before they become recovery problems.
These capabilities address several operational challenges discussed earlier, particularly synchronization, readiness management and coordination of failover activities.
Nevertheless, OneFailover does not remove the need for independently designed message continuity, resilient traffic routing, downstream application availability or transaction reconciliation.
Those responsibilities remain part of the enterprise integration architecture. For organizations evaluating recovery management, the central question should be whether the solution helps make the complete failover process more predictable, observable and repeatable.
The larger lesson: Regional failover is a business process, not only a technical switch
The AWS us-east-1 incidents demonstrate how easily a local technical fault can become a prolonged service disruption through shared dependencies and cascading recovery behavior. The November 2020 event highlights the importance of monitoring and dependency visibility. The December 2021 event illustrates why recovery operations should minimize reliance on potentially impaired management systems. The October 2025 event shows why restoring infrastructure is not the same as restoring every dependent application or business transaction.
For SAP Integration Suite teams, these lessons point toward a broader understanding of resilience.
A well-designed regional failover architecture should do more than move integration flows between tenants. It should preserve essential processing capabilities, protect transaction integrity, identify incomplete work and support controlled recovery when parts of the wider environment remain unavailable.
The most valuable disaster recovery question is therefore not simply:
Can we switch to another region? It is: Can we restore our critical integration-dependent business processes safely, within acceptable recovery limits, and with sufficient evidence that the results are correct?
Answering that question requires architectural preparation, independent monitoring, measurable recovery objectives and regular testing.
For organizations reviewing their existing SAP Integration Suite resilience approach, Tarento can help assess regional dependencies, synchronization requirements, failover procedures and operational readiness.
Review your SAP Integration Suite failover architecture or explore OneFailover to understand how a more structured recovery approach can support your integration landscape.


